

# Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update

1<sup>st</sup> – 31<sup>st</sup> August 2006

World Bank/DSF




As part of an analytical support program to the peace process, the Conflict and Community Development Program, within the World Bank Office Indonesia, is using a newspaper conflict mapping methodology to record and categorize all incidents of conflict in Aceh as reported in two provincial newspapers (Serambi and Aceh Kita). The Program publishes monthly updates and analysis of the data, complemented by fieldwork where possible, in both English and Indonesian.<sup>1</sup>

The August figures show just how far the peace process has come. No GAM-Government conflict incidents were reported and the one-year anniversary of the signing of the MoU was accompanied by widespread celebrations of peace and increased freedom from ordinary Acehnese. There were protests around the content of the Law on Governing Aceh (LoGA), but these remained non-violent. However, climbing levels of local level conflict—August figures were the highest since monitoring began in early 2005—shows that issues remain. In particular, there has been a rise in cases related to the upcoming local elections, and to the provision of tsunami aid. While most cases have remained small and non-violent, it will be careful to track these in coming months. There has also been a rise in incidents of “moral vigilantism”. As the LoGA strengthens the implementation of *syar'iah* Islamic law, attention will need to be paid to the ways in which these laws are applied.

### ***There were no GAM-GoI incidents reported in August***

Consistent with the pattern since the start of 2006, there continues to be very a limited number of incidents of conflict between GAM and the Government of Indonesia (GoI). There were no reported incidents in August 2006 (see Figure 1). Last month's Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update provided information on a serious incident between GAM and GoI in Payo Bakong, Aceh Utara. This incident was scheduled to be discussed at the 40<sup>th</sup> CoSA meeting in August. However, this discussion was delayed due to the one-year MoU anniversary celebrations. The issue was discussed at the 41<sup>st</sup> and 42<sup>nd</sup> CoSA meetings held in September. September's update will provide information on the resolution of this case.

**Figure 1: GAM-GoI incidents by month**



### ***One year anniversary of the MoU highlights success of peace process but challenges remain***

On the 15<sup>th</sup> August 2005, a landmark peace agreement was signed between GAM and the GoI in Helsinki. To date implementation of the MoU has been highly successful. Weapons have been

<sup>1</sup> There are limitations to using newspapers to map conflict, for more analysis of the methodology see: Patrick Barron and Joanne Sharpe (2005). “Counting Conflict: Using Newspaper Reports to Understand Violence in Indonesia”, *Indonesian Social Development Paper No. 7*. Jakarta: World Bank. This report, as well as the monthly monitoring updates, are available online at: [www.conflictanddevelopment.org](http://www.conflictanddevelopment.org). The dataset is available for those interested, please contact Samuel Clark at: [sclark@wboj.or.id](mailto:sclark@wboj.or.id).

decommissioned and troops relocated under the supervision of AMM; former GAM combatants and other participating in GAM activities have returned home; the LoGA implementing the terms of the MoU has been passed; and the provincial government, with assistance from various agencies, has begun to put in place mechanisms for facilitating reintegration and assisting individuals and communities affected by conflict. These monthly conflict monitoring updates have tracked many of these developments.

The one-year anniversary of the signing of the MoU provided an opportunity to showcase what has been a highly successful transition from violent conflict to peace. Indonesia's Vice President, Jusuf Kalla, senior GAM representative, Malik Mahmud, and Chairman of Helsinki negotiations, Martti Ahtisaari were amongst the dignitaries to attend the official ceremony. In addition to this ceremony, tens of thousands of Acehnese rallied in Banda Aceh, with crowds crying "Peace!" and "Long live the Acehnese!" The crowds came from all areas of Aceh with reports of heavy traffic congestion along the main Banda Aceh – Medan highway both leading up to and following the event. However, as well as celebration, many participants were protesting and accused the central government of failing to uphold the terms of the MoU in entirety in the LoGA.

In many ways, the demonstrations are indicative of just how successful the peace process has been. The one year anniversary rallies are by far the biggest the province has seen in many years. Arguably local authorities would not support such large public demonstrations had there been no peace agreement nor if it was flailing. The future challenge, then, will be channelling this community activism and ensuring public expectations are met. With the massive influx of decentralization, DAU and reconstruction funds, Aceh will become one of the richest provinces per capita in Indonesia. The local government now has significant resources as well as authority to develop and implement locally appropriate policy to address expectations and grievances. In many ways, it is now up to local authorities, rather than Jakarta, to translate the peace and terms of the MoU/LoGA into concrete actions that will benefit all elements of Acehnese society.

#### ***Pilkada-related incidents increasing but no violence reported***

A dataset on *pilkada*(local election)-related conflict incidents indicates that, unsurprisingly, these incidents have increased over the past three months (see Figure 2).<sup>2</sup> Only two incidents were reported in July, compared to six and nine in August and September respectively (18 in September if all four news sources are utilized). The increase in *pilkada*-related conflict incidents is unsurprising as the election draws near. The types of incidents recorded thus far are unique to this stage of the elections. As Figure 3 indicates, the majority of incidents either involve intra-party, group/individual versus the state, or other cleavages. The other category largely relates to intra-government conflict, that is, incidents between various arms of the government involved in some way with implementation of the elections.


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<sup>2</sup> As part of a joint World Bank and UNDP study on the upcoming *pilkada* elections, data is being collected on *pilkada*-related conflict incidents. In many ways this is similar to the methodology used for Aceh Conflict Monitoring Updates, the only difference being the former will utilize four instead of two newspaper sources: Serambi Indonesia, Aceh Kita, Rakyat Aceh, and Waspada.

**Figure 2: Pilkada-related incidents by month**



**Figure 3: Pilkada-related incidents by cleavage (July-mid Sept)<sup>3</sup>**




One example of “intra-party” conflict is the disagreements amongst various senior GAM figures. Numerous articles in Aceh Kita and Serambi between 23<sup>rd</sup> and 28<sup>th</sup> August reported on conflict between various GAM/KPA figures over which candidate has GAM/KPA support. Some articles state GAM/KPA support for the Human-Hasbi candidature; others say that support lies with the recently announced Yusuf-Nazar team. Having multiple candidates with GAM affiliation may have important ramifications, particularly at the local-level, both in terms of the chances of GAM winning and the likelihood of local conflict. This will required continued monitoring.

An “intra-government” example from August was reports of conflict between the KIP (the electoral commission) and the DPRD (local parliament) in Nagan Raya district. Serambi reported ongoing conflict over the passing of KIP’s budget, with KIP representatives claiming that the DPRD’s ongoing delays and excuses were negatively affecting the commission’s ability to get its work done. The DPRD stated that technical reasons were causing the delay. So far, no *pilkada*-related incidents have resulted in violence. The Conflict Monitoring Update series will continue to report on *pilkada*-related conflicts in the run in to the election.


**Local level conflict remains high**

Local level conflict increased to its highest level since monitoring began, with 84 incidents reported in August (see Figure 4). However, violent incidents continued to remain low level (Figure 5).

**Figure 4: GAM-Gol and local level conflict by month**



**Figure 5: Non-violent and violent local level conflict by month**




**Tsunami-related incidents dramatically increase in August**

The number of tsunami-related incidents significantly increased to 20 in August, suggesting July’s steep decrease did not indicate a systematic decline (see Figure 6). Similar to previous months, the majority of disputes were administrative in nature (17). One example of an administrative dispute was reports of tsunami victims protesting to PLN, the state electricity company, in Blang Mangat (Lhokseumawe) and Jaya (Aceh Jaya) relating to payments of up to Rp. 900,000 (US\$100) for new electricity connections. The report alleged electricity installers were engaging in corruption with the official fee for connection set at Rp. 184,400.

<sup>3</sup> These figures vary slightly from those in Figure 2 as they include some data from September.

There were also a few tsunami-related incidents involving natural resources (3) particularly land. For example, Serambi reported that about a relatively minor dispute in kecamatan Samudera, Aceh Utara over the payment of compensation for land used by a non-government organization for the development of housing. The delay was reported to be the fault of BRR.

**Figure 6: Tsunami-related local conflict incidents by month**



***Vigilante incidents generally and “moral vigilantism” rise in August***

Overall, the number of vigilante type incidents in August increased to 12 incidents. Last month, we noted that two forms of vigilantism were being reported in newspapers: “OTK” incidents (*orang tak kenal* – unidentified assailants), and “moral vigilante” incidents. In August, the trend of increases in these cases continued. Importantly, for the first time three *violent* “moral vigilante” incidents were reported. In Samudera Geudong, Aceh Utara a group of youths attacked a *keramaian* (rural fair) torching one stall and destroying children’s play equipment. Similarly, in Cot Girek, Aceh Utara a group of about 30 youths also broke-up a *keramaian* causing damage to stalls and equipment. A third incident in Darul Kamal, Aceh Besar, involved a male beating a youth for engaging in an illicit relationship with the wife of his neighbor. These cases of violent moral vigilantism are a significant and somewhat worrying development.

Some commentators have expressed concern that the increased policing by the *syar’iah* police, and the general uncontested nature in which *syar’iah* has been implemented in Aceh, would give a green light for community policing of moral values.<sup>4</sup> A late-night raid on the UN compound by the *syar’iah* police in August, effectively violating various international treaties on diplomatic immunity, was but one of the most commonly discussed examples of continued *syar’iah* police activity. More positively, these and other incidents are starting to encourage a broader dialogue and critique of these practices, and of how they relate to *syar’iah* and human rights.<sup>5</sup> This ought to be encouraged as open and democratic dialogue will help to breakdown current simplifications of *syar’iah*, human rights and their relationship.

<sup>4</sup> See ICG (2006) “Islamic Law and Criminal Justice in Aceh” *Asia Report No. 117*, Jakarta/Brussels.

<sup>5</sup> See, for example, the exchange between Aguswandi and Zulkieflimansyah in the pages of *The Jakarta Post* in early September. Unfortunately, there has been less of this debate in the Indonesian language press.